OVER THE PAST FEW DECADES many attempts have been made to defend Hegel’s philosophy against those who denounce it as crypto-theological, dogmatic metaphysics. This was done first of all by foregrounding Hegel’s indebtedness to Kant, that is, by interpreting speculative science as a radicalization of Kant’s critical project. This emphasis on Hegel’s Kantian roots has resulted in a shift from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Science of Logic. Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness can be considered as (...) having made one of the most influential contributions to this shift. Pippin’s “nonmetaphysical” interpretation of Hegel rightly contends that the Science of Logic does not pertain to a reality existing independently of thought, but to “thought’s attempt to determine a priori what can be a possible thought of anything at all.” For Pippin this entails that Hegel should be regarded as appropriating “Kant’s claim about the ‘self-conscious,’ ultimately the ‘spontaneously’ self-conscious, character of all possible experience.” I agree with Pippin that one cannot understand Hegel unless “one understands the Hegelian investment, the original engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy.” I would hold, however, that Pippin’s interpretation of this engagement threatens to lose sight of the proper achievement of Hegel’s philosophy. By arguing that the unity of self-consciousness constitutes the “original source of Hegel’s hermetic claim about thought’s self-determination,” Pippin to my mind ignores, first, that Hegel takes the Kantian notion of self-consciousness to be nothing more than the concrete manifestation of the pure concept and, second, that Kant’s transcendental philosophy, though radically critical of the dogmatic metaphysics of his day, does all but abandon the possibility of a critical ontology. Defending Hegel against his antimetaphysical critics, Pippin is right in taking Hegel into the Kantian camp, but he does this by sacrificing the question as to the possibility of ontology, a question I believe to be pivotal for both Kant and Hegel. (shrink)

OVER THE PAST FEW DECADES many attempts have been made to defend Hegel’s philosophy against those who denounce it as crypto-theological, dogmatic metaphysics. This was done first of all by foregrounding Hegel’s indebtedness to Kant, that is, by interpreting speculative science as a radicalization of Kant’s critical project. This emphasis on Hegel’s Kantian roots has resulted in a shift from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Science of Logic. Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness can be considered as (...) having made one of the most influential contributions to this shift. Pippin’s “nonmetaphysical” interpretation of Hegel rightly contends that the Science of Logic does not pertain to a reality existing independently of thought, but to “thought’s attempt to determine a priori what can be a possible thought of anything at all.” For Pippin this entails that Hegel should be regarded as appropriating “Kant’s claim about the ‘self-conscious,’ ultimately the ‘spontaneously’ self-conscious, character of all possible experience.” I agree with Pippin that one cannot understand Hegel unless “one understands the Hegelian investment, the original engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy.” I would hold, however, that Pippin’s interpretation of this engagement threatens to lose sight of the proper achievement of Hegel’s philosophy. By arguing that the unity of self-consciousness constitutes the “original source of Hegel’s hermetic claim about thought’s self-determination,” Pippin to my mind ignores, first, that Hegel takes the Kantian notion of self-consciousness to be nothing more than the concrete manifestation of the pure concept and, second, that Kant’s transcendental philosophy, though radically critical of the dogmatic metaphysics of his day, does all but abandon the possibility of a critical ontology. Defending Hegel against his antimetaphysical critics, Pippin is right in taking Hegel into the Kantian camp, but he does this by sacrificing the question as to the possibility of ontology, a question I believe to be pivotal for both Kant and Hegel. (shrink)

The present paper aims to trace back Kant’s account of the schematism of the pure understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason to the Dissertation. I do so by discussing Kant’s understanding of sensible cognition in view of his assessment of metaphysics. I argue, first, that Kant in both texts aims to defend metaphysics against skeptical attacks by discarding those of its elements he considers unwarranted and, second, that this undertaking hinges on his account of concepts that function as the (...) sensible condition of cognition. Yet whereas Kant argues in 1770 that metaphysics must be purely intellectual, he in 1781 draws on his earlier account of sensible concepts to argue, against the Wolffians, that determining intelligible objects by purely intellectual means does not amount to cognition proper. (shrink)

Classical conceptual distinctions in philosophy of education assume an individualistic subjectivity and hide the learning that can take place in the space between child and adult. Grounded in two examples from experience I develop the argument that adults often put metaphorical sticks in their ears in their educational encounters with children. Hearers’ prejudices cause them to miss out on knowledge offered by the child, but not heard by the adult. This has to do with how adults view education, knowledge, as (...) much as child, and is even more extreme when child is also black. The idea is what Miranda Fricker calls ‘epistemic injustice’ which occurs when someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Although her work concerns gender and race, I extrapolate her radical ideas to child. Awareness of the epistemic injustice that is done to children and my proposal for increased epistemic modesty and epistemic equality could help transform pedagogical spaces to include child subjects as educators. A way forward is suggested that involves ‘cracking’ the concept of child and a different non-individualised conception of education. (shrink)

Recently, Weisbecker and Goswami presented the first comprehensive comparative analysis of brain size, metabolic rate, and development periods in marsupial mammals. In this paper, a strictly energetic perspective is applied to identify general mammalian correlates of brain size evolution. In both marsupials and placentals, the duration or intensity of maternal investment is a key correlate of relative brain size, but here I show that allomaternal energy subsidies may also play a role. In marsupials, an energetic constraint on brain size in (...) adults is only revealed if we consider both metabolic and reproductive rates simultaneously, because a strong trade‐off between encephalization and offspring production masks the positive correlation between basal metabolic rate and brain size in a bivariate comparison. In conclusion, starting from an energetic perspective is warranted to elucidate relations between ecology, social systems, life history, and brain size in all mammals. (shrink)

Understanding between care providers and patients with stroke and aphasia: a phenomenological hermeneutic inquiry The present study illuminates the understanding in communication between formal care providers and patients with stroke and aphasia. Five care providers and three such patients participated in the study. Video recordings were made during conversations about pictures (n = 15), and the care providers were also interviewed (n = 15) after the video‐recorded conversations. A phenomenological hermeneutic method of interpretation of the interview text was used. The (...) findings showed that a range of conditions for ‘understanding and being understood’ in the communication on the part of the care providers exists. These different conditions are: lacking both knowledge and understanding; having knowledge but not necessarily accompanied by understanding; and being in understanding. Within the condition ‘being in understanding’, the care providers create a feeling of at‐homeness in a relaxed atmosphere and thus have the opportunity to be in ‘understanding and being understood’ together with the patient. The condition ‘being in understanding’ appears in connection with the care providers’ creating of a ‘calm liturgy of caring’ by mediating humility and calm vitality affects to the patients, and further, when needed, being present on the level of mystery, i.e. caring communion. (shrink)

The philosophy for children curriculum was specially written by Matthew Lipman and colleagues for the teaching of philosophy by non-philosophically educated teachers from foundation phase to further education colleges. In this article I argue that such a curriculum is neither a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the teaching of philosophical thinking. The philosophical knowledge and pedagogical tact of the teacher remains salient, in that the open-ended and unpredictable nature of philosophical enquiry demands of teachers to think in the moment (...) and draw on their own knowledge and experience of academic philosophy. Providing specialist training or induction in the P4C curriculum cannot and should not replace undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in academic philosophy at universities. However, although for academic philosophers the use of the P4C curriculum could be beneficial, I will argue that its use poses the risk of wanting to form children into the ideal ‘abnormal’ child, the thinking child—the adult philosopher’s child positioned as such by the Lipman novels. The notion of narrativity is central in my argument. With the help of two picturebooks—The Three Pigs by David Weisner and Voices in the Park by Anthony Browne—I illustrate my claim that philosophy as ‘side-shadowing’ or meta-thinking can only be generated in the space ‘in between’ text, child and educator, thereby foregrounding a ‘pedagogy of exposure’ rather than ‘teacher proof’ texts. (shrink)

Les documents chinois, depuis le Iersiècle, indiens, depuis le Vesiècle, et arabes, depuis le IXesiècle, contiennent des procédures tabulaires similaires pour l'extraction de racines carrées et cubiques avec des systèmes de numération positionnels. Par ailleurs tant Jia Xian, astronome chinois du XIesiècle, qu'al-Samaw'al, mathématicien arabe du XIIesiècle, ont extrait des racines de degré plus élevé par la procédure dite de Ruffini-Horner. L'article tente de définir une méthode textuelle pour organiser ce corpus, en y distinguant des axes pertinents qui permettent de (...) dégager similarités et différences, d'un point de vue tant historique que conceptuel. Une première partie analyse trois états différents des descriptions d'algorithmes entre le Iersiècle et le XIesiècle en Chine, qui présentent chacun une stabilité historique certaine. La réécriture qui fait passer d'un état au suivant laisse émerger progressivement une uniformité dans les composantes de l'algorithme, laquelle culmine avec des procédures du type Ruffini-Horner. Des critères textuels font apparaître une affinité plus grande de certains algorithmes, tels ceux décrits par Kūshyār ibn Labbān (ca1000), avec les textes chinois qu'avec les textes indiens, plus proches, eux, des algorithmes décrits par al-Khwārizmī. Des critères de même nature lient, d'une part, les algorithmes de Jia Xian et d'al-Samaw'al, d'autre part les algorithmes de Kūshyār et d'al-Samaw'al. (shrink)

How do scientists generate knowledge in groups, and how have they done so in the past? How do epistemically motivated social interactions influence or even drive this process? These questions speak to core interests of both history and philosophy of science. Idealised models and formal arguments have been suggested to illuminate the social epistemology of science, but their conclusions are not directly applicable to scientific practice. This paper uses one of these models as a lens and historiographical tool in the (...) examination of actual scientific collectives. It centres on the analysis of two episodes from the history of photosynthesis research of the late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth centuries, which display a wide and coordinated intellectual diversity similar to Kitcher’s “division of cognitive labour”. The concept, I argue, captures important aspects of the photosynthesis research communities, but the underlying process unfolded in ways that differ from the model’s assumption in interesting ways. The paper unravels how the self-organised interplay of cooperation and competition, and the dynamics of individual and collective goals within scientific communities were influential factors in the generation of knowledge. From there, some thoughts are developed on how historical and philosophical approaches in the analysis of science can productively interact. (shrink)

While literature is often used as a source of examples and illustrations across disciplines, literary studies tends to be underrepresented in interdisciplinary exchanges. Perhaps the reason lies in a lack of understanding what actually is the expertise of literary studies and how this can be useful in interdisciplinary settings. In this article, I propose to outline the expertise of literary scholars through concepts of 4E cognition and to devise a proposal for how such expertise could successfully shape the epistemic common (...) ground of social cognition of experts in interdisciplinary dialogue. Literature involves metacognition centrally through its language style, the design of the narrative and its links to other texts, and literary scholars have the expertise in formulating exactly how this works – in a non-mimetic way – through the analysis and interpretation of literary texts. This very particular expertise and practice of literary scholars enables literary texts to be proposed as a boundary object in interdisciplinary dialogues through a shared epistemic common ground. For this argument, I build on earlier theoretical work in 4E cognition and predictive processing and my experience running interdisciplinary workshops on that model. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to reflect on the way in which a certain neoliberal logic and rationality have become common-sense and to contemplate the possibility of a different aesthetic. The tone or mood of this piece draws on recent work on atmosphere, affect and complexity, which will be used to explore the theme of neoliberalism within the context of the university. In the course of this discussion, I will consider questions such as: how could a different aesthetic (...) influence the university as public space; the curriculum and academic community and friendship? How could a different aesthetic respond to epistemic, ontological and, inherently tied to them, spatial injustice? (shrink)

In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing , Miranda Fricker introduces the helpful notion of “identity prejudice” as “a label for prejudices against people qua social type” . She focuses on race, class and gender, and Michael Hand in his article What Do Kids Know? A response to Karin Murris is indeed correct when he states that I have applied her arguments to age as a category of epistemic exclusion.I argue that among the usual contenders (...) of epistemic prejudices, we also need to be cognisant of adults’ implicit and explicit assumptions and prejudices about child and childhood. However, Hand incorrectly uses Fricker’s ideas to reject my proposal to include child as being on the receiving end of epistemic injustice. A close reading of some passages about stereotyping will show why this is the case and why his own claim that “children typically are immature, ill-informed and endearing” will turn out to .. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a philosophical approach to the emotion ‘love’, as a response to more psychological approaches presupposed in ‘emotional intelligence’, ‘emotional literacy’ programmes, or how some Philosophy for Children practitioners interpret ‘caring thinking’. Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy of emotions expressed in her book Love’s Knowledge, and the complex arguments contained within it have been given a narrative context: the picturebook Frog in Love by Max Velthuijs. The narrative contextualisation shows how literature can be used to explore the meaning (...) of love philosophically, but also it is an illustration of how some works of literature can do justice to the complexity involved in understanding emotions. The paper starts with an exposition of one of the sources of a currently popular view of emotion by psychologists and educators. Originally conceptualised by Plato, emotions are regarded as mental states in need of mastery and control. As a result, some parents and educators argue that their age and experience puts them in an advantageous position to tame youngsters’ wild ‘sides’ and to help them ‘mature’ into adults who understand and manage their emotions, and become so-called emotionally ‘literate’ or ‘emotionally intelligent’. For educators it is an appealing promise of empowerment and achievement for all . One particular approach to teaching and learning called Philosophy with Children is also increasingly promoted and adopted in schools as a vehicle for emotional ‘intelligence’ or emotional ‘literacy’ . The caring thinking it encourages is interpreted psychologically often without acknowledging its moral and political dimensions. After a brief introduction of P4C, I problematise a psychological understanding of emotion by focusing on one book in particular, Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge. With the help of the picturebook Frog in Love I entangle some of her complex arguments about ‘love’, what it means, and how literature can provide insight. I argue against a behaviourist approach to emotions, and through phronesis, that is, a detailed exploration of ‘love’ in the context of Frog in Love I intend to show an alternative, philosophical approach to emotions that regards emotions as neither fixed entities, nor feelings ‘inside’ our ‘selves’ that need to be managed or controlled, but as complex judgments, as linguistic concepts. Psychological approaches to emotions often misunderstand the ‘golden mean’ principle to mean self-discipline and willpower, but for Aristotle self-control is not a virtue. Instead, I argue how emotions need to be regarded as informative expressions of and responses to dynamic social relationships and return at the end of the paper to the relevance of this point of view for the theory and practice of P4C as phronesis. (shrink)

During the first years of organized agricultural research in Mexico in the 1940s, two agencies ran separate programs for corn improvement. The Rockefeller Foundation's Office of Special Studies and the Mexican government's Office of Experiment Stations carried out research on corn with distinct aims and methods. That they differed strongly is well established in the literature. Many authors have discussed a Rockefeller Foundation program that reportedly emphasized hybrid corn, a technical choice that embodied a preference for assisting wealthy farmers who (...) could afford hybrid corn and the necessary agricultural inputs. Conversely, these authors attribute to the Mexican program a focus on open-pollinated corn, which presumably manifested its concern for Mexico's small farmers who saved seed. This article argues that the reverse was true. The Rockefeller Foundation program initially was committed to a type of improved open-pollinated corn while the Mexican program proceeded with a strict, U.S.-style hybrid program. I try to illuminate each group's priority on yield, as well as additional significant, and complicating, breeding priorities that precluded any collaboration between the two. (shrink)

In the years 1919 to 1923, Otto Warburg published four papers that were to revolutionise the field of photosynthesis. In these articles, he introduced a number of new techniques to measure the rate of photosynthesis, put forward a new model of the mechanism and added a completely new perspective to the topic by attempting to establish the process’s efficiency in terms of the light quantum requirement. In this paper I trace the roots of Warburg’s series of contributions to photosynthesis research (...) by exploring three different contexts of inspiration: Warburg’s own research into cell respiration, his father’s work on the quantum yield of photochemical reactions in general and the photosynthesis work carried out by Richard Willstätter and Arthur Stoll. When these influences are considered together, it becomes clear that Warburg implemented a Building Block Strategy in his research: rather than inventing his photosynthesis model from scratch, he availed himself of fragments from other contexts, which he then recombined in a new and innovative way. This way of working is considered to be standard practice in scientific research. (shrink)

In this article I aim to clarify the nature of Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science by focusing on his conception of transcendental reflection. The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued, consists primarily in liberating the productive strand of former general metaphysics - its reflection on the a priori elements of all knowledge - from the uncritical application of these elements to all things and to things that can only be thought. After considering Kant’s (...) conception of metaphysics and his various uses of the term ‘transcendental’ I closely examine his account of logical and transcendental reflection in the section entitled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. Whereas commentators generally attribute the activity called transcendental reflection to Kant alone, I contend, first, that Kant regarded philosophy as such to rely on a mode of transcendental reflection and, second, that the critical mode of transcendental reflection enacted in the Critique itself yields insight into the reason why our a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of possible objects. This is illustrated by outlining the difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’ employment of the concepts of reflection. (shrink)

Because we tend to study fight books in isolation, we often forget how difficult it is to understand the precise place they occupy in the sociocultural and historical fabric of their time, and spill the many clues they inevitably contain on their owner, their local society, their precise purpose. In order to unlock that information, we need to study them in their broader sociocultural and historical context. This requires a background and research skills that are not always easily accessible to (...) everyone. To illustrate the point, in this paper I show in some detail what is required to make sense of the claim that Aristotelian philosophy and science influenced the medieval fight books in relevant ways, and that understanding this influence helps us to better understand the fight books per se. I give an outline of the general historical framework, and apply it to a testcase: Talhoffer’s Thott 290 2° Ms., with some interesting results. My hope is that this framework may be of some use to other researchers in HEMA Studies who want to dig deeper in sources of interest to them. (shrink)

Background: Neglect and abuse of elders in care institutions is a recurring issue in the media. Elders in care institutions are vulnerable due to their physical, cognitive, and verbal limitations. Such vulnerabilities may make them more susceptible to mistreatment by caregivers on whom they are heavily dependent. Objectives: The goal was to understand caregivers’ concerns about ensuring correct and proper treatment, as well as their experiences with neglect and abuse of older patients. This article examines resources and challenges of (...) professional ethics within the care setting. Research design: A study was conducted to explore the quality of care provided to older patients in nursing homes, geriatrics institutions, and ambulant care in the northwest region of Switzerland. Participants and research context: A total of 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted with nursing staff of varying experience levels. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was granted by the competent regional ethics commission, Ethikkomission Nordwest-und Zentralschweiz EKNZ [Ethics Commission Northwest and Central Switzerland]. Findings: Three themes emerged from our data analysis: professional identity, professional context, and professional relationships. Our findings indicate mutual vulnerabilities within these three themes, characterizing the interactions between nursing staff and older patients. Study participants believe that incidences of error, neglect, and abuse are consequences of their own vulnerability since they are not able to meet the demands of an overstraining work situation. Discussion: Different aspects of this mutual vulnerability are described and critically discussed as challenges for professional ethics. Conclusion: Early education, continuous training as well as better management and response from the institution are necessary to maintain professionalism while handling mutual vulnerabilities. (shrink)

abstract: This paper has two related aims. The first is to argue that Fichte's concept of freedom is perfectionist. By 'perfectionism,' I mean a moral theory according to which our good, ultimately, is realizing our true nature; Fichte also holds a perfectionist view of freedom, according to which we achieve freedom only to the extent that we succeed in making ourselves good or realizing our true nature. The second aim of this paper is to show how Fichte's perfectionist concept of (...) freedom solves two problems confronting Kantian autonomy: the "paradox" of Kantian autonomy and the "dilemma" of post-Kantian autonomy. As I contend, Fichte's perfectionist concept of freedom avoids these two problems by enabling us to view self-determination as a form of self-causation, and by showing that we can be responsible for our immoral actions even if we are not fully free when we perform them. (shrink)

Kant developed a distinctive method of philosophical argumentation, the method of transcendental argumentation, which continues to have contemporary philosophical promise. Yet there is considerable disagreement among Kant's interpreters concerning the aim of transcendental arguments. On ambitious interpretations, transcendental arguments aim to establish certain necessary features of the world from the conditions of our thinking about or experiencing the world; they are world-directed. On modest interpretations, transcendental arguments aim to show that certain beliefs have a special status that renders them invulnerable (...) to skeptical doubts; they are belief-directed. This paper brings Kierkegaard's thesis of the “subjectivity of truth” to bear on these questions concerning the aim of transcendental arguments. I focus on Kant's argument for the postulate of God's existence in his Critique of Practical Reason and show that Kierkegaard's thesis of the subjectivity of truth can help us construe the argument as both belief and world directed. Yet I also argue that Kierkegaard's thesis of the subjectivity of truth can help us understand the source of our dissatisfaction with Kant's transcendental arguments: It can help us understand that dissatisfaction as an expression of what Stanley Cavell calls the “cover of skepticism,” the conversion of metaphysical finitude into intellectual lack. (shrink)

It will be shown in this article that an ontological approach for some problems related to the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) could emerge from a re-evaluation of the main paradox of early Greek thought: the paradox of Being and non-Being, and the solutions presented to it by Plato and Aristotle. More well known are the derivative paradoxes of Zeno: the paradox of motion and the paradox of the One and the Many. They stem from what was perceived by classical (...) philosophy to be the fundamental enigma for thinking about the world: the seemingly contradictory results that followed from the co-incidence of being and non-being in the world of change and motion as we experience it, and the experience of absolute existence here and now. The most clear expression of both stances can be found, again following classical thought, in the thinking of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Parmenides of Elea. The problem put forward by these paradoxes reduces for both Plato and Aristotle to the possibility of the existence of stable objects as a necessary condition for knowledge. Hence the primarily ontological nature of the solutions they proposed: Plato’s Theory of Forms and Aristotle’s metaphysics and logic. Plato’s and Aristotle’s systems are argued here to do on the ontological level essentially the same: to introduce stability in the world by introducing the notion of a separable, stable object, for which a ‘principle of contradiction’ is valid: an object cannot be and not-be at the same place at the same time. So it becomes possible to forbid contradiction on an epistemological level, and thus to guarantee the certainty of knowledge that seemed to be threatened before. After leaving Aristotelian metaphysics, early modern science had to cope with these problems: it did so by introducing “space” as the seat of stability, and “time” as the theater of motion. But the ontological structure present in this solution remained the same. Therefore the fundamental notion ‘separable system’, related to the notions observation and measurement, themselves related to the modern concepts of space and time, appears to be intrinsically problematic, because it is inextricably connected to classical logic on the ontological level. We see therefore the problems dealt with by quantum logic not as merely formal, and the problem of ‘non-locality’ as related to it, indicating the need to re-think the notions system, entity, as well as the implications of the operation ‘measurement’, which is seen here as an application of classical logic (including its ontological consequences) on the material world. (shrink)

The new terrorism is a major exemplifying case for complexity theory – for example, it exemplifies major disproportionalities between cause and effect, unpredictable outcomes, and self-organizing, emergent structures. It also illustrates, I argue in this article, the emergence of global microstructures: of forms of connectivity and coordination that combine global reach with microstructural mechanisms that instantiate self-organizing principles and patterns. Global systems based on microstructural principles do not exhibit institutional complexity but rather the asymmetries, unpredictabilities and playfulness of complex (and (...) dispersed) interaction patterns. The analysis of complex global microstructures helps to collect and assess empirical evidence for the architecture of the global structural forms of a world society. It also suggests a theory of microglobalization – the view that the texture of a global world becomes articulated through microstructural patterns that develop in the shadow of (but liberated from) national and local institutional patterns. (shrink)

In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward asks us to reconceptualize the metaphysics of agency. To make room for agency, she argues, we must reject: the Causal Theory of Action, the view that causation is exclusively bottom-up, and the view that agency is compatible with causal determinism. I am convinced by Steward’s arguments against the first two views, but not by her arguments against the third. There are non-reductive compatibilist alternatives to Steward’s incompatibilist account of action as settling. The idea (...) of agent as robust metaphysical settler of matters concerning the movements of her body is not part of the folk-psychological conception of agency. The causal role that folk psychology ascribes to agents is compatible with determinism of a certain form. (shrink)

In both her fiction and her essays on writing and feminist theory, Monique Wittig takes up and redeploys traditional themes and genres as well as recent theories of language, literature, and writing in order to force change in and through the dominant categories of thought and language. She has announced her project as one which would "do away with the category of sex" by way of reconfiguring the grammatically and conceptually enforced compulsory heterosexual order. I examine the specific linguistic mechanisms (...) by which Wittig accomplishes this abolition of "sex" and the political/philosophical/linguistic consequences of her "lesbianization" of language. Through-out, I aim to suggest what the political importance of The Lesbian Body as a diversified and written corpus is. (shrink)

In both her fiction and her essays on writing and feminist theory, Monique Wittig takes up and redeploys traditional themes and genres as well as recent theories of language, literature, and writing in order to force change in and through the dominant categories of thought and language. She has announced her project as one which would “do away with the category of sex” by way of reconfiguring the grammatically and conceptually enforced compulsory heterosexual order. I examine the specific linguistic mechanisms (...) by which Wittig accomplishes this abolition of “sex” and the political/philosophical/ linguistic consequences of her “lesbianization” of language. Throughout, I aim to suggest what the political importance of The Lesbian Body as a diversified and written corpus is. (shrink)

I think in images. Poems help me to do this.1 In the Beginning was a major exhibition of Anselm Kiefer’s work at the Bundeskunsthalle in Bonn in 2012. The exhibition included, among other works, several large-scale lead book sculptures, and featured Bavel Balal Mabul,2 an installation filling an entire room and bringing together many of Kiefer’s key themes: mythology, memory, and history; apocalypse, regeneration, and transformation. It shows the tower of Babel in the shape of a spiral staircase-like structure, spanning (...) from floor to ceiling. Tumbling down the metal stairs are picture rolls that gather at the bottom of the tower like the wastage on the cutting room floor of.. (shrink)

In his treatises Hero of Alexandria describes a range of devices for producing spectacles and generating wonder that have frequently been treated as marginal by historians of technology and science. In this paper I shall show that these devices and Hero’s emphasis on wonder-making are of central importance to the image that Hero presents of mechanics. Hero uses the concept of wonder to add an intellectual component to the utility of mechanics, to strengthen the epistemological claims of mechanics and to (...) relate mechanical expertise to divine cunning. He is thereby able to present mechanics as a form of knowledge which is epistemically on a par with philosophy, but which still maintains powerful practical consequence.Author Keywords: Hero of Alexandria; Wonder; Automata; Ancient Mechanics; Ancient Science. (shrink)

In this essay I propose a new measure of social welfare. It captures the intuitive idea that quantity, quality, and equality of individual welfare all matter for social welfare. More precisely, it satisfies six conditions: Equivalence, Dominance, Quality, Strict Monotonicity, Equality and Asymmetry. These state that i) populations equivalent in individual welfare are equal in social welfare; ii) a population that dominates another in individual welfare is better; iii) a population that has a higher average welfare than another population is (...) better, other things being equal; iv) the addition of a well-faring individual makes a population better, whereas the addition of an ill-faring individual makes a population worse; v) a population that has a higher degree of equality than another population is better, other things being equal; and vi) individual illfare matters more for social welfare than individual welfare. By satisfying the six conditions, the measure improves on previously proposed measures, such as the utilitarian Total and Average measures, as well as different kinds of Prioritarian measures. (shrink)

Investigation of Empiricism. On Ernst Mach’s Conception of the Thought Experiment. The paper argues that Ernst Mach’s conception of the thought experiment from 1897/1905 holds a singular position in the lively discussions and repeated theorizations that have continued up to the present in relation to this procedure. Mach derives the thought experiment from scientific practice, and does not oppose it to the physical experiment, but, on the contrary, endows it with a robust relation to the facts. For Mach, the thought (...) experiment is a reliable means of determining empiricism, and at the same time a real, because open and unbiased, experimenting. To shed light on this approach, the paper carries out a close reading of the relevant texts in Mach’s body of writings (in their different stages of revision) and proceeds in three steps: first, Mach’s processual understanding of science will be presented, which also characterizes his research and publication practice (I. ‘Aperçu’ and ‘Sketch’. Science as Process and Projection); then in a second step the physiological and biological justification and valorization of memory and association will be examined with which Mach limits the relevance of categories such as consciousness and will (II. The Biology of Consciousness. Or The Polyp Colony); against this background, thirdly, the specific empiricism can be revealed that Mach inscribes into the thought experiment by on the one hand founding it in the memory and association, and on the other by tracing it back to geometry, which he deploys as an experimenting oriented to experience (III. Thinking and Experience. The Thought Experiment). (shrink)

I Zum Begriff „Intertextualität“ Als eines der herausragendsten Merkmale des literarischen Werkes Yoel Hoffmanns ist die ausgesprochen dichte Verwobenheit seines Textes mit Intertexten, seine Intertextualität, zu nennen. Verschiedentlich wurde auf diese Eigenschaft Hoffmannscher Schriften hingewiesen und hier und dort zeigten Literaturwissenschaftler auch Verbindungen zu Werken anderer Autoren auf. Die Frage aber nach der Beschaffenheit dieser Intertextualität, mehr noch nach dem Sinn dieser literarischen Praxis Hoffmanns wurde bisher nicht gestellt. Im Folgenden beabsichtige ich, auf diese Frage zu antworten.

In the following paper I look at the body as a site where individual and communal normative structures come into view. Drawing from the work of Sigmund Freud and Paul Ricoeur, and through an analysis of the compulsion to repeat, I offer an understanding of psychoanalysis as a practice whereby we decipher the body’s call to configure our individual lives more humanly. This involves the interruption of the compulsion to repeat and the transition from an instinctual and organic development, towards (...) an ‘Erotic life.’ I also broaden the scope of the analysis and investigate the kinds of communal structures or bonds that the psychoanalytic concept of an ‘Erotic drive’ calls for. To this end, I introduce Walter Benjamin’s studies on the relation between different temporal and political structures. (shrink)

The idea of personalized nutrition is to give tailored dietary advice based on personal health-related data, i.e. phenotoype, genotype, or lifestyle. PN may be seen as part of a general trend towards personalised health care and currently various types of business models are already offering such services in the market. This paper explores ethical issues of PN by examining how PN services within the contextual environment of four future scenarios about health and nutrition in Europe might affect aspects of social (...) justice according to Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach. The scenarios have been created by a mixed group of stakeholders and experts in three consecutive workshops. This resulted in the definition of four future scenarios within a scenario space consisting of two variables: the ‘logic of health care systems’ and ‘conception of health’. Within each scenario, PN is likely to play a more or less important role in improving health by influencing food consumption patterns in society. Nussbaum’s capability approach implies a concept of social justice as a function of a minimum standard of human dignity. This denotes an account for equality in terms of a minimum of entitlements. However, also the ability of achieving individual objectives is essential for social justice. Personalisation advice in health and food consumption patterns, as aimed for by PN, is therefore acceptable provided a minimum of entitlements is guaranteed to all members of a society, and at the same time freedom concerning personal preferences is respected. Potential variation of how different people might benefit from PN should therefore be consistent with the minimum required as defined by the list of capabilities. (shrink)

If, as I propose, Hecuba represents fate and Medea contingency, taken together they constitute as well as reveal the tragic within the tension between the ontological and empirical status of man as it is embodied in the clash between necessity and freedom. Viewing this tension within the perspective of the unconditional status of the love of the mother, I will show how both narratives belong to the realm of possibilities and cause, what Ricoeur calls “suffering for the sake of understanding”. (...) I will argue that the phenomenon of the unconditional love of the mother is in itself tragic and open to both the appearance of both Medea and Hecuba. (shrink)

If, as I propose, Hecuba represents fate and Medea contingency, taken together they constitute as well as reveal the tragic within the tension between the ontological and empirical status of man as it is embodied in the clash between necessity and freedom. Viewing this tension within the perspective of the unconditional status of the love of the mother, I will show how both narratives belong to the realm of possibilities and cause, what Ricoeur calls “suffering for the sake of understanding”. (...) I will argue that the phenomenon of the unconditional love of the mother is in itself tragic and open to both the appearance of both Medea and Hecuba. (shrink)

"Thinking about thinking", the topic of this section of our volume, leads us into an Escherian web of self-referential interconnections — which nevertheless make sense, at least if we do not shy away at once in the face of paradox, for fear of inconsistency. How do our critical faculties enter the picture? Adding a few conceptual dimensions to the merely linearly causal one may help us to shed light on the issue, and may help us also to understand some of (...) the basic strategies "Western" thought has developed throughout its historical pathway in its conscious dealings with the 'real'. Of course, in a few pages it is impossible to do justice to this complicated subject. But I'll try to give the reader an as clear as possible description of the, in my view, crucial issues, pointing out the ways they resonate into the many fields of interest represented in the intended readership, and leave it to the reader to dig deeper through the given references. (shrink)

Recension av boken _Gravstenar berättar. Judiskt liv i Stockholm 1775-1875 _.

Our concern in the following pages will be the ontology of the relation between living beings (especially, but not exclusively, humans) and the technological artefacts of our late-industrial society. The theme is not new, but important in the context of the emergence and globalisation of so called “post- modern” society. The eventual originality of the present contribution is to be situated in its interpretative framework, i.e., a specific conception of reality's deep ontology, overlooked in general exactly because of the “technological” (...) structure impressed since centuries upon our ways of perceiving of and reasoning about the world. I refer to this neglected but fundamental characteristic of reality as its ontological paradoxicality. (shrink)

In their recent work, L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor discuss a remarkable connection between diverging conceptions of the mathematical infinite in Russia and France at the beginning of the twentieth century and the religious convictions of their respective authors. They expand much more on the Russian side of the cultural equation they propose; I do believe, however, that the French (or rather ‘West European’) side is more complex than it seems, and that digging deeper into it is worthwhile. In this (...) paper I shall therefore broaden the path laid out in Graham and Kantor’s work, by connecting two different strands of research concerning the origin of what I loosely call ‘formal’ ideas: firstly, the rich but complex relation between logic and rhetoric throughout European cultural history, and secondly, the impact of religious convictions on the formation of certain mathematical and scientific ideas during Renaissance and Early Modernity, especially but not exclusively in France. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Obesity Treatment:One Size Does Not Fit AllKarin KwambaiI am obese. That phrase is actually very hard for me to say out loud. Saying it feels as if I am standing at an “obesity anonymous” meeting, except there is nothing anonymous about being fat. Everyone knows it. I often feel that it is the first and only thing people notice about me. I’ve been overweight, chubby, fat my entire life. (...) My mom enrolled me in Weight Watchers when I was 12 years old; I learned to use Molly McButter in front of her and sneak oatmeal cream pies when she wasn’t looking. I’ve learned a lot of maladjusted behaviors around food over a lifetime of trying to lose weight. I’ve tried meal replacement shakes, pills, souping, juicing, and the “Master Cleanse”—a diet of lemonade with cayenne pepper and maple syrup. All of these tactics only messed up my mind and body even more. The summer before my freshman year of college, I literally ate only an apple a day because I was so worried about not making new friends because of my weight. It was not about being healthy; it was about being accepted.Twenty years of blame and shame later, and despite mixed reviews on its success, Weight Watchers is still the first recommendation for weight loss from my doctor, along with Medifast, a 1000 calorie a day diet, or bariatric surgery. My naturopath told me to make my smoothies and spinach salads smaller, and my therapist told me I think too much about exercise and should “just do it.” I have gone many rounds with Weight Watchers and had some success. I have also had success losing weight by tracking food intake and exercise on apps like My Fitness Pal. But like all attempts at losing weight, following medical advice works until it stops working, and the weight comes back—plus some.Obesity as a DiseaseI recently sought treatment with an Obesity Specialist, but after an inspiring complimentary consult where she explained her holistic approach, I found out that my health insurance won’t cover the cost because the diagnostic code for obesity is excluded from my coverage. I have heard that the Affordable Care Act is supposed to impact insurance plans covering the cost of obesity treatment, but that has not been the case for me. In fact, I’ve been forced to pay out of pocket several times for labs that doctors feel the need to run, despite my urging that I am not diabetic. Trust me, I say; I know what diabetes looks like. I have watched family die and seen clients suffer, and I am earning my Masters in Public Health. I had been hopeful that the recent classification of obesity as a disease by the American Medical Association would open treatment doors, but it has not. In fact, I’m concerned that it will close doors for treatment opportunities because of how insurance [End Page 104] companies decide what medical costs they will cover. Obesity seems to be a four–letter word for health insurance companies. My insurance plan will cover prescription medications for high blood pressure, high blood sugar, and high cholesterol, but it won’t cover weight loss medications. Where is the incentive to address weight loss before potentially developing a life–threatening disease? I believe that obesity is a disease; I just don’t trust how the healthcare system will handle the responsibility of addressing it as such.In fact, the debate on whether obesity is a disease or a lifestyle is a frustrating one for me. If we claim lifestyle is the cause of obesity, it means that there is only one factor causing obesity. If that were true, then the commonly prescribed solution of “eat less, move more” would be more effective. The reality is, there is no single cause or cure for obesity; there is no one–size–fits–all treatment approach. It is a complex problem that deserves a complex response in the forms of primary, secondary and tertiary public health interventions. I am hopeful that classifying obesity as a disease will lead to more disease model research... (shrink)

In this essay I argue that even though egalitarianism and prioritarianism are different theories of social welfare, they can use the same social welfare measures. I present six different arguments for this thesis. The first argument is that conceptual connections between egalitarianism and prioritarianism ensure that any measure that works for either theory works for both. The second argument is that conditions necessary and sufficient to identify egalitarian and prioritarian measures, respectively, are equivalent. The third argument is that both egalitarianism (...) and prioritarianism can use two standard measures, typically proposed for only one theory. The fourth to sixth arguments contend that four properties that have been proposed as distinctive of either egalitarian or prioritarian measures cannot distinguish between them. I conclude that any egalitarian measure is also a prioritarian measure, and vice versa. (shrink)

ArgumentThe famousCahiersof Paul Valéry cannot be reduced to a single scientific discipline, a specific philosophical tradition, or a literary genre. For today's reader these notebooks constitute a formatsui generis, one very often characterized by an “observation of a second order”: in theCahiersValéry uses writing, drawing, and calculating not only for purposes of argumentation; he also pays attention to the significance of such writing, drawing, and calculating processes for the production of knowledge. It is particularly thepracticeof note-taking and sketching in Valéry's (...) notebooks that documents, rehearses, or questions the medial and instrumental conditions of both scientific research and artistic production. This is especially true of the early stages of theCahiersin the years beginning around 1894 when Valéry was intensely searching for notation systems that would be conducive to his research interests. At the time the problem of how to write was intrinsically bound up with the way he established his notebooks as a specific scene of writing. By closely examining a number of pages from the early notebooks I hope to show that the emerging regulation of Valéry's writing in theCahiersresults from simple operations that are noted and repeated by the writer until they gradually become procedures. What Valéry'sCahiersshow us, however, is that procedures do not always work in favor of a final synthesis, but may also give rise to a format of eternal beginning. In the following I will present some of the constitutive procedures found in Valéry's early notebooks, procedures that range from a tentative gathering together and simple forms of recursion and variation to the rehearsing or invention of symbolic or graphic forms of notation. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss a person’s freedom to choose whatever that person may reasonably prefer to choose. This type of freedom of choice may be regarded as a candidate for a social good, being a hybrid between freedom of choice and preference satisfaction utility. To separate this preference dependent freedom of choice from other types, we may call it opportunity. The essay is concerned with the question of how opportunity should be identified and measured. I discuss what conditions an (...) opportunity measure should satisfy and propose that an opportunity measure should satisfy at least four specific conditions. I then present a new class of measures which satisfy the four conditions (the Root measures). Last I prove that these measures are the only ones that satisfy the conditions, given the extra assumption that the measures are analytic functions with non-zero partial derivatives. (shrink)

Summary Fabricius ab Aquapendente commissioned coloured paintings of the reproductive parts and foetuses of a vast spectrum of animals. His published works on generation feature corresponding engravings. In contrast, his student William Harvey questioned the accuracy and usefulness of anatomical illustrations and used alternative approaches to represent his observations. I discuss these anatomists' criteria for selecting specimens, their techniques of investigation, and how these decisions affected their observations and representations of animal generation. I consider what each medium—paintings, intaglios, written accounts—discloses (...) or highlights and also their respective limitations. My study of Fabricius's colour plates also reveals the possibility that they served as inspiration for the first colour anatomical prints: a copy of the illustrations of foetuses is bound with drafts of Aselli's plates, and I suggest a possible link between the colour images. (shrink)